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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature of the Case 
 
 Mark Howard Pendleton was charged with felony possession of a controlled 
substance – methamphetamine, unlawful possession of a firearm, and a persistent 
violator sentencing enhancement.  Mr. Pendleton filed a motion to suppress, which the 
district court denied after determining Mr. Pendleton did not have standing to challenge 
the search of the building where the methamphetamine and firearm at issue had been 
found.  Following a jury trial, the jury found Mr. Pendleton guilty of possession of a 
controlled substance – methamphetamine. Pursuant to a plea agreement, 
Mr. Pendleton then agreed to plead guilty to unlawful possession of a firearm and admit 
to the persistent violator sentencing enhancement.  Mr. Pendleton appealed, asserting 
the district court erred when it determined he did not have standing to challenge the 
search of the building. 
 In its Respondent’s Brief, the State argued Mr. Pendleton could not establish he 
met his burden of showing he had standing to challenge the search of any location 
where evidence was actually obtained because of the lack of evidence presented at the 
motion to suppress hearing about the nature of the location searched, including where 
different items were discovered.  (Resp. Br., p.8.)  The State also contended the district 
court specifically acknowledged there was some expectation of privacy in a workplace, 
and found Mr. Pendleton failed to show any expectation of privacy on that basis.  (Resp. 
Br., p.10.)  The State further contended Mr. Pendleton did not establish that the items 
sought to be suppressed were located in a particular part of the building over which he 
had a reasonable expectation of privacy.  (Resp. Br., p.12.)   
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 This Reply Brief is necessary to address certain arguments by the State.  
Mr. Pendleton presented evidence on the type of building where the search occurred 
through his sworn direct testimony at the motion to suppress hearing.  The district court 
never specifically acknowledged there was some expectation of privacy in a workplace, 
and based its determination on the State’s legally incorrect argument that Mr. Pendleton 
could not have standing unless he claimed the building was his place of residence.  
Mr. Pendleton’s testimony indicated his workplace included the entire building, and he 
had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the building as his workplace. 
 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated 
in Mr. Pendleton’s Appellant’s Brief.  They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but 
are incorporated herein by reference thereto. 
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ISSUE 
Did the district court err when it determined Mr. Pendleton did not have standing to 




The District Court Erred When It Determined Mr. Pendleton Did Not Have Standing To 




 Mr. Pendleton asserts the district court erred when it determined he did not have 
standing to challenge the search of the building.  The district court determined 
Mr. Pendleton could not have standing unless he claimed the building was his place of 
residence.  (See Tr., Feb. 19, 2015, p.61, Ls.14-18.)  Contrary to the district court’s 
determination, one may have standing to challenge the search of one’s workplace.  
E.g., O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987); Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364 
(1968).  Here, Mr. Pendleton had standing to challenge the search because he had a 
subjective expectation of privacy in the place searched that society is willing to 
recognize as reasonable.  See State v. Pruss, 145 Idaho 623, 626 (2008). 
 
B. Mr. Pendleton Had Standing To Challenge The Search Because He Had A 
Subjective Expectation Of Privacy In The Place Searched That Society Is Willing 
To Recognize As Reasonable 
 
 Mr. Pendleton asserts he had standing to challenge the search of the building 
because he had a subjective expectation of privacy in the place searched that society is 
willing to recognize as reasonable.   
 In the Respondent’s Brief, the State argues Mr. Pendleton did not identify in his 
motion to suppress what in particular should be suppressed, nor did he present any 
evidence at the motion to suppress hearing on what was seized during the search, 
where the items were seized from, or what testimony or information resulted from the 
search.  (See Resp. Br., p.6.)  The State argues “[t]here was also no evidence 
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presented as to the scope of the search conducted or the type of building where the 
search occurred,” but recognizes Mr. Pendleton “referred to it as a ‘building’ where he 
‘did work’ and kept tools.”  (Resp. Br., p.6.)  Mr. Pendleton made those references 
during his sworn direct testimony at the motion to suppress hearing.  (Tr., Feb. 19, 
2015, p.52, Ls.11-12, p.54, Ls.6-7, 17-18.)  In other words, despite the State’s 
argument, Mr. Pendleton presented testimony or evidence on the type of building where 
the search occurred.  See, e.g., Black’s Law Dictionary 1514 (8th ed. 2004) (defining 
“testimony” as “[e]vidence that a competent witness under oath or affirmation gives at 
trial or in an affidavit or deposition”).1 
 The State further contends Mr. Pendleton’s assertion “ignores the entirety of the 
district court’s comments, particularly the comments specifically acknowledging there is 
‘some expectation of privacy at a workplace,’ and the court’s finding that [Mr.] Pendleton 
failed to show any expectation of privacy on that basis.”  (Resp. Br., p.10.)  However, 
the State is incorrect, and omits part of the district court’s comments. 
 The district court did not “specifically acknowledg[e] there is ‘some expectation of 
privacy at a workplace.’”  Rather, the district court stated: 
Now, there was some alluding to authority involving workplace and 
whether an employee has some expectation of privacy at a workplace. 
   
I’m confident that there is some authority that relates to that.  I have 
in my own mind my own understanding as to how far that authority will go, 
but I can say very clearly today that, based upon the testimony that the 
                                            
1 The State also argues the preliminary hearing transcript cannot be relied upon for 
purposes of reviewing the district court’s denial of the motion to suppress, because it 
was not offered as evidence at the motion to suppress hearing.  (Resp. Br., p.8.)  This 
point is well-taken.  Indeed, Mr. Pendleton has not asserted on appeal the Court should 
consider the preliminary hearing transcript when deciding the merits of the issue 
presented.  (See generally App. Br., pp.11-17.)  Rather, the testimony from the 
preliminary hearing was cited to provide context (see generally App. Br., pp.1-4). 
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Court has heard today, the Court can make no finding that there was any 
expectation of privacy established by you based upon your 
assertions today. 
 
(Tr., Feb. 19, 2015, p.62, Ls.6-15.)  Earlier, the district court told Mr. Pendleton with 
respect to the items found at the building, “[t]he Court can’t make a finding that they 
should be suppressed without some initial standing.  And if you’re claiming today that 
this is not your place of residence, then the Court simply, as [the State] correctly pointed 
out, cannot proceed any further.”  (Tr., Feb. 19, 2015, p.61, Ls.14-18.)   
 At the motion to suppress hearing, the State had argued Mr. Pendleton “has 
definitively shown this Court he does not reside at that location.  And if he doesn’t reside 
at that location, he had no reasonable expectation of privacy at that location.”  
(Tr., Feb. 19, 2015, p.58, Ls.5-8.)  The State also argued, “I’m not aware of any case 
law that says you have an expectation of privacy at your workplace.”  (Tr., Feb. 19, 
2015, p.59, Ls.21-23.)  
 The district court based its determination on the State’s legally incorrect 
argument Mr. Pendleton could not have standing unless he claimed the building was his 
place of residence.  (See Tr., Feb. 19, 2015, p.58, Ls.5-8, p.59, Ls.21-23, p.61, Ls.14-
18.)   As explored in the Appellant’s Brief (App. Br., pp.14-16), the United States 
Supreme Court has actually held that, “[w]ithin the workplace context, this Court has 
recognized that employees may have a reasonable expectation of privacy against 
intrusions by police.”  O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 716 (citing Mancusi, 392 U.S. 364).  The 
district court never specifically acknowledged there was some expectation of privacy at 
a workplace, but only acknowledged there was “some authority that relates to that.”  
(See Tr., Feb. 19, 2015, p.62, Ls.6-15.)   
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 On appeal, the State has omitted the part of the district court’s comments 
expressing the district court was relying upon the State’s legally incorrect argument.  
(Compare Tr., Feb. 19, 2015, p.61, Ls.15-18 (“And if you’re claiming today that this is 
not your place of residence, then the Court simply, as [the State] correctly pointed out, 
cannot proceed any further.”), with Resp. Br., p.9 (“And if you’re claiming today that this 
is not your place of residence, then the Court simply . . . cannot proceed any further.”).)  
The entirety of the district court’s comments show the district court erred by determining 
Mr. Pendleton could not have standing unless he claimed the building was his place 
of residence.   
 Additionally, the State argues Mr. Pendleton did not establish “that the items 
sought to be suppressed were located in a particular place inside the building over 
which [Mr.] Pendleton had a reasonable expectation of privacy.”  (Resp. Br., p.12.)  The 
State disputes the analogy drawn between the office in Mancusi and Mr. Pendleton’s 
building workplace here, arguing that Mancusi “does not stand for the proposition that 
an employee has standing to challenge a search of an entire building in which he 
works.”  (Resp. Br., pp.11-12.)  While Mancusi involved an office as opposed to an 
entire building, see Mancusi, 392 U.S. at 369, the analogy drawn by Mr. Pendleton does 
not break down based on that factual difference.   
 The State has neglected to mention that the United States Supreme Court has 
delineated the boundaries of the workplace context: “The workplace includes those 
areas and items that are related to work and are generally within the employer’s control.  
At a hospital, for example, the hallways, cafeteria, offices, desks, and file cabinets, 
among other areas, are all part of the workplace.”  O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 715-16.  The 
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O’Connor Court held, “[w]ithin the workplace context, this Court has recognized that 
employees may have a reasonable expectation of privacy against intrusions by police.”  
Id. at 716.  The O’Connor Court also indicated whether an employee has a reasonable 
expectation of privacy could depend on the work environment and must be addressed 
based on the individual case.  See id. at 717-18 (“Given the great variety of work 
environments in the public sector, the question whether an employee has a reasonable 
expectation of privacy must be addressed on a case-by-case basis.”). 
 Thus, the boundaries of the workplace are not necessarily confined to one’s 
office.  Here, Mr. Pendleton’s testimony that he cleaned the outside of the building, 
stored his tools inside the building, and had responsibility to secure the building (see 
Tr., Feb. 19, 2015, p.54, Ls.6-9, 18-19), suggests his workplace included the entire 
building because it was related to his work and generally under his employer’s control.  
See O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 715-16.  Mr. Pendleton therefore could reasonably have 
expected that he would not be disturbed in the building, as his workplace, except by 
personal or business invitees.  See Mancusi, 392 U.S. at 369.  Mr. Pendleton had a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the building as his workplace.2 
Because Mr. Pendleton had a subjective expectation of privacy in the place 
searched that society is willing to recognize as reasonable, he had a legitimate 
expectation of privacy or standing to challenge the search of the building.  See Pruss, 
                                            
2 The State also contends the testimony and argument from the preliminary hearing 
support its conclusion Mr. Pendleton did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy.  
(See Resp. Br., pp.12-13.)  However, this contention would seem to contradict the 
State’s earlier argument that the preliminary hearing transcript “cannot be relied on for 
purposes of reviewing the district court’s denial of [Mr.] Pendleton’s suppression 
motion.”  (See Resp. Br., p.8.) 
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145 Idaho at 626.  The district court therefore erred when it determined Mr. Pendleton 
did not have standing to challenge the search. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 For the above reasons, as well as the reasons contained in the Appellant’s Brief, 
Mr. Pendleton respectfully requests this Court vacate his judgment of conviction, vacate 
the district court’s order denying his motion to suppress, and remand the case to the 
district court for further proceedings. 
 DATED this 14th day of September, 2016. 
 
      ___________/s/______________ 
      BEN P. MCGREEVY 
      Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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